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THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
CITIZEN SUITS: GOTCHA!
HoPi- BABCOCK*
The states are permitted to act unjusdy only because the highest
court in the land has, by its own will, moved the middle ground
and narrowed the nation's power.'
I. IN1I7ODUCTION
The current Supreme Court has substantially expanded the scope of protection
from lawsuits accorded to states by the Eleventh Amendment and narrowed the
exceptions to its application. As a result, many people are finding they are unable
to vindicate federal rights in any court when the defendant is a state or a state
agency. The most recent example of this is the Court's decision in South Carokna
State Ports Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission,2 in which the Court extended
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment to private administrative enforcement
actions against states, thus forsaking completely any connection to the text of the
Amendment.'
This trend in the Court's application of the Eleventh Amendment to shield
states from injured private citizens has potentially ominous implications for
citizens seeking to enforce federal environmental laws against states, as Justice
Breyer warned in his dissent in Colkge Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postseconday
Education Expense Board' States are important players in the administration of
many environmental laws, as recipients of delegated federal regulatory authority.
States also own, operate, and construct potentially polluting facilities, such as
hazardous waste landfills, hospitals, prisons, airports, roads, and reservoirs that
may violate federal law. Thus, they are often targets of citizen suits.
An examination of the effect of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence
on the private enforcement of environmental laws against states, therefore, is no
mere academic exercise.' In an atmosphere in which states are assuming a more
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING fiE NATION'S POWER: TIHE SUPREME COUiRT
SID-i, WITH THE STATES 156 (2002).
2. 243 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2001), affd, 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
3. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,707 (1999) (referring to previous Eleventh Amendment
Supreme Court cases and stating that "subsequent decisions reflect a settled doctrinal understanding
that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the
original Constitution'); William A. Fletcher, The ElvenIhAmendment: Unfli'shed Buiness, 75 Nonu.
DAME L. REv. 843, 857 (2000) (saying "all nine Justices have abandoned any thought, or pretense,
that the text of the Eleventh Amendment matters").
4. 527 U.S. 666, 693-705 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30,45-46 (1992) (Stevens,J., dissenting)
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central place in the administration of federal environmental laws and federal
oversight of state performance is lessening, any initiative that insulates states
from legal challenge takes on grave significance for environmentalists.' If
environmental plaintiffs cannot enforce federally mandated standards and
programmatic requirements against the states that run these programs, history
advises that the states may under-perform.7 Thus, a reinvigorated Eleventh
Amendment applied to citizen suits brought to enforce federal environmental
laws can as effectively undercut the impact of those laws as if Congress had
amended them to achieve the same result.
My paper focuses upon the impact of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence on citizen suits authorized under the Clean Water Act (CWA)5
because that law's cooperative federalism structure is typical of many other
environmental laws and because citizens suits have historically played a critical
role in its implementation. The Act's citizen suit provision (section 505), which
specifically incorporates the Eleventh Amendment,' has brought to bear on
citizen suits the full force and effect of the Court's current state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. The prevailing wisdom is that that jurisprudence will
not bar CWA citizen suits against states. I am not persuaded for the reasons set
out in this paper.
(referring to the Court's holding that 11 U.S.C. 1 06(c) does not waive immunity from an action
seeking monetary recovery in a bankruptcy proceeding, and stating that "Ithe cost to litigants, to
the legislature, and to the public at large of this sort of judicial lawmaking is substantial and
unfortunate. Its impact on individual citizens engaged in litigation against the sovereign is tragic.").
See alro Randall S. Abate & Carolyn H. Cogswell, Soereign Imtnity and Citizen Enforcement of Federal
EmirontmentalLaw.: A Prvposalfor a New Synttesir, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1995). Abate and (:ogwcll
suggest that it is inappropriate to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity to shield federal
plluting facilities from citizen suits. They argue that "Congress has incorporated limitations on
citizen suits and remedies," and that applying the doctrine will cause substantial injustice, "removing
controversies from the courts and placing them in ill-equipped forums, thereby producing final
determinations without the necessary procedural safeguardsI and . . . inefficiently allocating
controversies to other forums when well-suited for court resolution"). Id. at 7.
6. Seegeeral#Rena I. Steinzor, Detvolution and the PublicHealtb, 24 HARV. ENVIL. L. Ri.V. 351
(2000) (describing and cataloguing the effects of devolution on the oversight of state performance
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the diminution in public health protection).
7. Id at 399-419 (describing how the states are falling behind in their capacity to respond
to first generation environmental problems). See also J hn P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federafism Under
the Cean Air Act, 54 MD. L REv. 1183, 1199-1216 (1995) (describing EPA's tepid enforcement
efforts against "recalcitrant states regarding inspection and maintenance programs" under the Clean
Air Act). But see id (arguing that while states had a poor record before enactment of the basic
environmental laws, that record has improved considerably).
8. 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1387 (2000).
9. Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000) ('IA]ny citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf... against ... any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the ekventh amendment to the Constitution .. ") (emphasis added).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ELEVENTi-i AMENDMENTJURISPRUI)I. :NCI.:
(IN BRIEF)
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is surprisingly clear and short given how
far a field from the text the Court has wandered and how much controversy its
application has created. The Amendment provides that "[t]heJudialpower of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
proseatted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State..' Over the years, the Supreme Court has found
license in this language to apply the Amendment to suits brought to enforce
federal mandates"1 in federal court against states by citizens of the same state,12 to
suits in state court, not just federal court, 3 and to federal administrative adjudicatory
proceedings." At the same time, the Court has narrowed the basis on which
Congress can abrogate that immunity,' on which a state will be considered to
10. U.S. CONSr. amend. XI (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), which held that Article III had abrogated any preexisting immunity the
states might have had and thereby allowed the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a private lawsuit
brought against the state of Georgia to collect a debt, led to the swift adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, which reversed that holding.
11. However, suits against state officials for violations of state law are barred by the E'leventh
Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. laldcrman, 465 U.S. 89,106 (1984) (holding that
the doctrine from Expare Yomng 209 U.S. 123 (1908), is inapplicable to a suit brought against a
state official to compel compliance with state law, and stating that "it is difficult to think of a greater
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform
their conduct to state law").
12. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment confirms
that principles of state sovereign immunity are embedded in the constitutional structure and thus
bars a citizen from bringing suits in federal court against his/her own state). The Eleventh
Amendment also bars suits brought by Indian tribes, see Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775 (1991), and by foreign countries, see Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313
(1934).
13. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes
a state from private lawsuits brought in its own courts under federal law).
14. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743 (2002). See alto RI. Dep't. of
Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding, among other things, that
the Eleventh Amendment provided no barrier to applying sovereign immunity principles to
administrative adjudications, and stating "(tlhe federal government cannot effectively negate
sovereign immunity simply by shifting the adjudication of private claims against non-consenting
states to administrative fora").
15. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding Congress cannot abrogate a
state's immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers). I lowever, Congress can abrogate a
state's immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, seeid. at 59, although "Itihere must
be a congruence andproportiona6 between the injury to be prevented or remedied ;by the legislationj
and the Ilegislativel means adopted to that end." See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997) (emphasis added). Moreover, the law must be based on a sufficient legislative record to
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have waived its immunity, 6 and the circumstances in which a court will find that
a litigant has successfully raised an Exparte Young 7 exception to state immunity.18
The Court's vague and overly broad rationales for protecting states from private
lawsuits-to prevent affronts to the dgni of the states9' and to preserve essential
demonstrate to the court that there is a large wrong or evil that Congress can lawfully act to correct,
i.e., there must be a history of "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights." See
id. at 526. See also Bd. of rrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (finding
Congress did not validly abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) because the legislative record did not contain clear evidence of a pattern of past
constitutional violations by the states); Kimel v. Fla. lid. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,91 (2000) (finding
that although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) contains a clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress exceeded its authority
under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to identify a pattern
of irrational state discrimination/disproportionate remedy); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672-91 (1999) (holding the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act was not a section 5 enactment).
16. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (stating that "Jtlhe test
for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a
stringent one'). Statutory, even constitutional, provisions merrtalloing a state to "sue and be sued"
in its own courts are insufficient to waive the state's immunity from suit in a federal forum. See
CoI Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676;Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241; Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n., 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981) (per curiam). But see Coll Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-76 (stating a federal court will find a waiver of immunity if the state
"voluntarily" invokes jurisdiction).
17. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Exparte Youn& the Court found the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits brought against state officials, in their official capacity, for prospective injunctive relief,
or prospective declaratory relief, designed to remedy ongoing violations of federal law. Id. at 159-
60. See also Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. ,erv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 648 (2002), where the Court
authorized suit seeking injunctive relief against the Maryland public service commissioners in their
official capacity. Butsee Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (barring
suits for recovery of money brought only against state officials when "the state is the real,
substantial party in interest").
18. See, e.g., Idaho v. Cocur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,287-88 (1997) (declining to apply the
Exparte YNoug doctrine when important state sovereign functions are involved); Seminole Trbe, 517
U.S. at 74-75 (stating that the Exparle Young doctrine does not apply when there is a preclusive
congressional remedial scheme); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,668 (1974) (finding that federal
courts cannot order state officials to remedy past violations of federal law by paying funds out of
the state treasury given that such relief "is in practical effect indistinguishable.., from an award of
damages against the State").
19. See Seminok Ttibe, 517 U.S. at 58 C'The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in
order to 'preven[tI federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury'; it also serves
to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties."') (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). See also Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (noting that states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty"); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(holding that the limit on federal judicial power is an essential element of constitutional design, as
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The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
state functions- t-- can easily be construed to cover a wide range of putative
threats to states implicit in just about any lawsuit.
The Court has also made clear that Eleventh Amendment immunity extends
beyond the states to "arms" or "instrumentalities" of the state, i.e., state
departments and agencies, where the state is the real party in interest.' The
lower courts have interpreted this extension broadly, sweeping in most state
agencies that might run afoul of a federal environmental mandate.2 Additionally,
the Court considers that the Amendment "sufficiently partakes" of subject matter
jurisdiction so that a state may assert it as a defense for the first time on appeal.'
To a large extent the Court's federalism jurisprudence, of which its Eleventh
Amendment decisions are a part, reflects the thinking of those in Congress and
the Administration who support devolution of federal regulatory authority to the
states. This is particularly troubling, since the commonality of thinking on this
immunity "accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation"); Pennhurst
State Sch. & losp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (making it clear that its decision was
driven by the indignity to which a state is subjected when a federal court orders that state's officials
conform their conduct with their own laws); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,505 (1887) ("The very object
and purpose of the 11 th Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.").
20. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 283 (holding the Eleventh Amendment bars an Indian
tribe from seeking injunctive relief in federal court in a suit to establish title to land and stating that
"Inlot only would the relief block all attempts by these officials to exercise jurisdiction over a
substantial portion of land but also would divest the State of its sovereign control over submerged
lands"). See also Aen, 527 U.S. at 749 C'Tjo press a State's own courts into federal service ... is
... to turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of
the State against its will and at the behest of individuals," permitting courts and private litigants to
disrupt the basic resource allocations of state governments).
21. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997). See also Welch v. Tex.
Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 480 (1987) (absent a waiver, neither a state nor
agencies acting under its control may "be subject to suit in federal court").
22. See, e.g., Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1319 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
University of Cincinnati is a state instrumentality and, therefore, amenable to suit in the Ohio Court
of Claims and that the hospital is an agent of the University that is entitled to immunity from suit
in federal court). Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, does not extend to cities or counties.
See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
609 n.10 (2001); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,400-01
(1979); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). The Court has left open the question
whether Eleventh Amendment immunity stretches to interstate compact commissions or officials.
See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Fludson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 n.20 (1994) (holding Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not apply to a regional authority, even though there is "no 'perse rule
[precluding the application of the Eleventh Amendmentl when States act in concert') (citation
omitted). Bui see Souders v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 48 F.3d 546, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATVA) Compact did not waive
WM.ATA's Eleventh Amendment immunity to nuisance suit challenging noise levels).
23. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974).
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issue decreases the already slim likelihood that Congress would undertake any
corrective action should the Court decide to shield the states from citizen suits
brought to enforce federal mandates.
The general thinking is that the Court's state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence does not apply to the CWA or to other pollution control statutes
that employ a cooperative federalism model. This thinking is largely based on
footnote 17 in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,2' which suggests that section 505 of the
CWA implicitly authorizes suits against states under the Exparte Young exception
to the Eleventh Amendment.25 Although there are two other exceptions to the
application of the Eleventh Amendment, abrogation and waiver, this paper
concentrates on the effectiveness of the Exparte Young doctrine because of the
Court's encouraging words in footnote 17. Unfortunately, citizen suits under the
CWA, and other environmental laws authorizing private rights of action, may be
vulnerable to an Eleventh Amendment defense because of how the lower courts
have narrowed the reach of that doctrine.
In Exparte Young, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suit against a state official acting in violation of federal law.2' Although often
termed a legal fiction,27 the doctrine is premised on the unassailable idea that a
state cannot authorize its officials to violate the Constitution and laws of the
United States.28 Thus, such an action is not considered an action of the state and
cannot be shielded from suit by a state's immunity. Therefore, when this
24. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
25. See id. at 75 n.17 (distinguishing the CWA from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
because the former does not contain a remedial scheme that would be less expansive than that
which is imposed under the Exparte Young doctrine).
26. Expade Young, 209 U.S. 123,159-60 (1908) (stating that the state official is "stripped of
his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. 'The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United States.") (citation omitted).
27. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261,270 (1997) (calling the Exparte Yomng doctrine
a fiction to the extent that it distinguishes between a state and an officer acting on the state's behalf.
'The Court stated, however, that the fiction is necessary to maintain the balance of power between
state and federal governments. See id. at 293 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
28. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,30 (1991) ("'[S]ince Expade Yomng' we said, 'it has been
settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim
that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law."') (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,237 (1974)) (first alteration in original) (internal citation omitted); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (stating that the Exparte Young doctrine
is necessary "to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials
responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States"') (quoting Exparye Youg, 209 U.S. at
160). If such a suit is successful, the state officer may be held personally liable for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30-31.
[Vol. 10:205
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doctrine applies, a state officer can be sued for violating a mandatory federal
duty.29
Although the courts have narrowed the effectiveness of Exparte Young as a
shield against an Eleventh Amendment motion to dismiss in several ways, 30 only
one of these-the characterization of the law, under which suit has been
29. While a court lacks authority to prevent a state official from performing a discretionary
function, an injunction prohibiting a state official from doing something she has no legal right to
do is not an interference with that official's discretion. Exparte Yoing, 209 U.S. at 150-51. See aso
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (noting that the opinion leaves open
alternative means to ensure that states comply with federal laws by pointing out that "an individual
can bring suit against a state officer.., to ensure that the officer's conduct is in compliance with
federal law") (citations omitted); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 146 (1993) (noting that Exparte Young "ensures that state officials do not employ the Eleventh
Amendment as a means of avoiding compliance with federal law"). A state official can raise as a
defense the lack of "direct authority and practical ability to enforce the challenged statute." Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Ci. 2002).
30. For example, litigants relying on the Ex pale Young exception are entitled only to
prospective relief and that which does not require payment of funds from the state. See Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 102-03. See also Pennhurst State Sch. & I losp. v. H-lalderman, 451 U.S. 1, 29 (1981)
(Pennhurst 1) C'ln no case, however, have we required a state to provide money to plaintiffs much
less required a state to take on such open-ended and potentially burdensome obligation" as the
structural relief here.); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar suit to compel future state compliance with federal standards governing the processing
of welfare applicants, but does bar an injunction ordering retroactive payment of previously owed
benefits); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing
suit for prospective relief under the CWA); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 1.3d
1477, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit alleging the
attorney's fees provision in Wyoming's surface mining statute violated the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) because the suit sought prospective relief, rather than retrospective
relief. See also MSA Realty Corp. v. Ill., 990 '.2d 288, 295 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding, among other
things, "that the eleventh amendment bars a claim fo~r injunctive relief... that would require direct
payments by the state from its treasury for the indirect benefit of a specific entity"). Cf Manning
v. S.C. Dep't of Highway & Pub. Transp., 914 F.2d 44,48-49 (4th Cir. 1990) (barring a landowner's
Declaratory Judgment Act suit, which sought a declaration that his rights were violated under
certain South Carolina condemnation statutes, because issuance of declaratory judgment would have
the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages). Additionally, the Court has not allowed
litigants to use the Exparte Young doctrine to seek relief against a state where the relief requested
would implicate the special sovereignty interest of the state, see Coeurd'Akene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 261
(holding the Eleventh Amendment barred an Indian tribe from seeking injunctive relief in a federal
court against a state in a suit to establish title to submerged lands), or where the relief they would
gain under the doctrine would exceed that authorized by Congress in the law they were seeking to
enforce, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (stating that "where Congress has prescribed a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based
upon Exparte Young").
2003]
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brought-is discussed here because it is the most problematic for environmental
litigants.
III. THE PENNHUR3T DECISION AND Il, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON CITIZEN
SuITs BROUGHT AGAINST STATES UNDER DELEGATED FEDERAL PROGIAMS
The problem originates with how some circuits are applying Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman,31 which holds that citizens cannot sue state
officials in federal court for violations of state law, regardless of the nature of
relief sought.' 2 The question Pennhurst raises for potential environmental litigants
is whether a claim made under a delegated federal regulatory program is asking
a federal court to enforce federal law or state law against a state. The Fourth
Circuit, in Bragg v. West Virginia CoalAssn,33 answered that question by saying,
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 4 it is
unquestionably state law' s The Bragg court's answer has serious implications not
only for citizen suits under SMCRA, but, also for potential suits brought under
other pollution control laws like the CWA, because of the similarities between the
federalism structures of SMCRA and other pollution control laws.
The Fourth Circuit, in Bragg, found that a federally approved state surface
mining program, which authorized West Virginia to promulgate mine operation
and reclamation standards and issue permits, was state law, not federal law,
because the version of "cooperative federalism" employed in SMCRA provides
for "extraordinary deference to the States."' The circuit court further said SMCRA
calls for either state or federal regulation of surface coal mining within its
borders, "but not both[,]" 37 finding in SMCRA a unique structure which calls for
the federal government "to hand over to the States the task of enforcing
minimum national standards ... providing only limited federal mechanisms to
oversee State enforcement.""8  According to the circuit court, SMCRA's
federalism model is, therefore, "quite unlike the cooperative regime under the
Clean Water Act.""- The errors committed by the Fourth Circuit in reaching this
conclusion are surprising.
31. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
32. Id. at 106.
33. 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
34. 30 U.S.C. % 1201-1328 (2000).
35. Brag& 248 F.3d at 297 ("[Rjather than asking the States to enforce the federal law,
Congress through SMCRA invited the States to create their own laws, which would be of'exclusive'
force in the regulation of surface mining within their borders.") (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id. at 294.
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First, the Bragg court over-emphasized language appearing in section 503 of
SMCRA that directs states wishing "to assume exclusive jurisdiction" over the
regulation of surface mining to submit a state program to the Secretary for his
approval."' In emphasizing the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction,"'" and finding in
it a basis to distinguish SMCRA from other cooperative federalism laws like the
CWA, the Bragg court ignored the many indicia of residual federal authority in
states with "regulatory primacy" under SMCRA (for example, the federal Office
of Surface Mining's (OSM) power to withdraw federal approval of a state
regulatory program and substitute a federal program in its stead,42 enforce against
violations in states with regulatory primacy,43 and enter any mine site in a state
with an approved regulatory program"). If anything, SMCRA is the morefederal
of the two laws.
Second, in its eagerness to emphasize SMCRA's "extraordinary deference to
the States,' '45 the Bragg court failed to see the state features in cooperative
federalism laws like the CWA,4" which the court specifically distinguished from
SMCRA.4" Thus, the indicia of reserved federal authority and "extraordinary
deference to States" are apparent in both laws, and there is simply not the sharp
distinction between the two laws that the Bragg court implies.
Third, in its effort to distinguish the CWA, the Bragg court misinterpreted what
the Supreme Court said, and did, in Arkansas v. Oklahoma,4" mistakenly relying on
the case as proof that the CWA 'effectively incorporate[d' State law into the
unitary federal enforcement scheme, making State law, in certain circumstances,
federal law[,]"49 unlike SMCRA. In fact, the Court in Arkansas specifically
declined to address the question of whether the CWA required EPA to apply the
downstream state's water quality standards precisely because the permit involved
was a federal permit issued under section 402(a)9' and not under a delegated state
permit program (section 402(b)),5' inferring that the answer might be different
40. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2000) (emphasis added). It is worth noting that this phrase appears
nowhere else in the statute and is used in § 1253(a) merely to introduce a set of detailed
requirements for states intending to seek delegated regulatory authority.
41. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294.
42. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3) (2000).
43. Id. § 1271.
44. I § 1267(a).
45. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 293 (reading SMCRA to "exhibiti I extraordinary deference to the
States").
46. See, for example, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000), delegating to states permitting, inspection,
enforcement, and standard setting authority, and id. § 1342(c), delegating authority to the states to
suspend the federal permitting program upon submission of an approvable state program.
47. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294.
48. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
49. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294 (referencing Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110) (alteration in original).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000).
51. Id §1342(b).
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if it were a section 402(b) permit.52 Moreover, somewhat ominously in light of
Bragg, the Court in Arkansas noted that Congress, in crafting the CWA, protected
certain state sovereign interests, citing as an example section 510,3' which allows
states to adopt more demanding pollution control standards than those
established under the Act."4
Under the Bragg court's understanding of how SMCRA works, "federal law
establishing minimum national standards . . . 'drop[s] out' as operative law
and... the State law[] ... become[s] the sole operative law."' The adoption of
federal minimum standards by a state as part of a federally approved state
regulatory program, therefore, means that any violation of those standards, even
if it is exactly the same as the federal standard, involves state, not federal law.
Any injunction from a federal court against state officials would be commanding
those officials to comport with the state's own laws because only the state law is
operative and directly regulates the issuance of permits. According to the Bragg
court, under Pennhurst, any such command to a state is "so abhorrent to the
values underlying our federal structure as to fall outside the bounds of the Ex
parte Young exception."
The Bragg court recognized that the federal interests in SMCRA are stronger
than those at issue in Pennhurst because the federal rights under SMCRA were
created by a state pursuant to a federal invitation to implement a program that
met certain minimum standards set by Congress, and because the federal
government "retains an important modicum of control over the enforcement
of. . . State law."' Nonetheless, the court found that Pennhurst controlled, i.e.,
the federalism design of the statute meant that the relief the citizens requested fell
on the Eleventh Amendment side of the line between the type of relief barred by
Pennhurst and that permitted under Exparte Young because it impaired the state's
dignity."8 According to the court, the state's dignity
52. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 104.
53. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000). Cf. 30 U.S.C. § 1255 (SMCAb\ provision granting states with
regulatory jurisdiction the same authority).
54. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 107.
55. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 295 (4th Cir 2001). See aso Pa. Fed'n of
Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2002) (making short work of
plaintiffs' argument that the Pennsylvania surface mining regulatory program, with its Pennsylvania-
specific standards, has been incorporated, or "codified" into federal law by virtue of its appearance
in the Code of Federal Regulations).
56. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296. The Third Circuit, in a similar case under SMCRA, leaves a slight
opening for suit in federal court under an approved regulatory program-namely, suit may be
tenable under the Exparte Young doctrine if the challenged element of the approved state program
is "inconsistent with - i.e., less stringent than" the federal requirements. See Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's
Clubs, Inc., 297 F.3d at 324. A challenge of this type would, however, add an additional element of
proof to the claim of what otherwise would have entailed only a showing of the violation.
57. Brgg, 248 F.3d at 296.
58. Id at 297-98.
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does not fade into oblivion merely because a State's law is enacted to comport with
a federal invitation to regulate within certain parameters and with federal agency
approval.... The West Virginia statute and implementing regulations are solely the
product of its own sovereignty, enacted pursuant to its democratic processes, and,
as was the case in Pennhurst, a State's sovereign dignity reserves to its own
institutions the task of keeping its officers in line with that law.'
Applying Pennhurst means that citizens can only enforce a law like SMCRA, as
it is now state law, in state court where they may well encounter other problems
and jurisdictional barriers -including sovereign immunity under state law. While
the federal government could withdraw or otherwise preempt a state's regulatory
authority, in this political climate, the chances of that happening seem highly
unlikely.
Given the structural similarities, not dissimilarities, between SMCRA and the
CWA, pointed out earlier in this article, it is hard to see why the same conclusion
would not hold true for CWA citizen suits, and why the Bragg court's de-centrist
reasoning would not resonate in other courts, as it already has," although not yet
in a CWA case. Applying the reasoning in Bragg and its application of Pennhurst
to the CWA, however, is not as far fetched as one might like to think. A
Wisconsin district court, in an opinion issued before Bragg, flagged the Pennhurlt
issue in a citizen suit brought against two state environmental officials for
violating the CWA's permitting provisions in a state with delegated permitting
authority. "I While noting that under the CWA's federalism design, EPA and the
state regulatory agencies share concurrent enforcement authority over violations
of state-issued permits, the district court said that "Congress clearly intended the
59. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 297 (citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc., 297 F.3d at 313-14, 324-30 (holding the
Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit alleging that the Secretary of Pennsylvania's )epartment
of Environmental Protection (PDEP) failed to maintain an adequate reclamation bonding system
as required by the state's approved surface mining program because: the claims were based on state,
not federal law; the state's surface mining program was not incorporated into federal law; and the
PDEP Secretary had no federally imposed duty to implement the state's program); W. Va.
Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit against the Secretary of the West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection for violating SMCRA's permanent bonding requirements because
"federal law is subsumed in the approved state program and, even where inconsistent with fedcral
law and disapproved by OSM, must be enforced as state law, absent affirmative ()SM action"
withdrawing the program). Cf. Farricielli v. I lolbrook, 215 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2000) (remanding to
the district court the question of whether claims filed under Subchapter C and D of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) were filed under federal or state law). But see Cox v. City
of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs alleged violations of federal law, not
state law, when they sued state officials for allowing an open dump in violation of RCRA, and,
therefore, Pennburst did not bar their lawsuit).
61. Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843,855 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
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states to take the kading role in issuing and enforing the NPDES system."'62 Although
that court went on to say that it would follow the lead of other courts that had
found jurisdiction to entertain citizen actions alleging violations of the CWA's
permitting provisions without addressing the Pennhurst question,"' it is worth
wondering whether the judge would have deferred the issue had he had the Bragg
decision before him.
IV. CONCLUSION
This discussion of the lower courts' application of Pennhurst to delegated
federal environmental regulatory programs leaves one with the uneasy feeling that
citizens seeking to enforce mandatory federal duties under the CWA against
states may face a formidable barrier. While no court has yet applied Pennhurst to
bar a CWA citizen suit, there is enough of a concern in the Brag decision to
imagine that might happen, even though that court badly misapprehended the
cooperative federalism structure of both SMCRA and the CWA.
Looking on the bright side, it is possible that litigants, faced with an Eleventh
Amendment defense, may be able to avoid Expare Young entirely by arguing that
the Eleventh Amendment has been waived by a state's acceptance of federal
grant money under the Spending Clause." Alternatively, as the Court suggested
62. Fivebe/, 13 1. Supp. 2d at 855 (emphasis added).
63. Id. The district court, as an example of such decisions, cited Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996). In that case, the Ninth Circuit allowed a claim
for injunctive relief to proceed under the CWA against the State Secretary of Transportation, and
stated that since
Congress intended to encourage and assist the public to participate in enforcing
the standards promulgated to reduce water pollution .. i., lit would seem
reasonable... Ito conclude] that Congress implicitly intended to authorize citizens
to bring Ex part Young suits against state officials with the responsibility to
comply with clean water standards and permits.
Id at 424 (citations omitted).
64. U.S.CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1(empowering Congress "to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). Although states will not be
considered to have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity by merely accepting federal funds,
see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985) ("ITIhe mere receipt of federal
funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court."), the federal government
can condition the receipt of those funds, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). I lowever, to
be judicially enforceable these conditions must be explicit Pennharst I, 451 U.S. at 25. Arguably
Congress has explicitly conditioned state program grants in 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (CWA section).
The Supremacy Clause would provide the basis for private litigants to enforce these conditions. See,
e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982) (holding that New York's no-cash and loss or theft rules,
which precluded providing emergency financial assistance, conflicted with federal regulations and
were therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause).
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inA/den v. Maine,6" citizens can always pressure the federal government to enforce
against the state itself, or exercise its authority to withdraw, or cabin in some way,
the delegation of federal authority to the state. Citizens can also seek relief in
state court against recalcitrant states.' So all may not be lost for those interested
in assuring that states abide by the federal mandates under which they have
assumed regulatory authority. However, each of these alternatives is wanting in
some way. This is what makes the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
potentially so troubling for environmental litigants.
65. 527 U.S. 706,759 (1999) (noting the availability of U.S. attorneys to sue on behalf of thc
plaintiff employees). But ire id. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (calling the prospect of federal
enforcement whenever private enforcement is barred "whimsy").
66. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Couts, Ciien Saits, and the Enforcement of Federal
En'irvnmentalLaw &y Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003 (2001) (arguing state courts are a
"niche" waiting to be filled by environmental litigants who lack Article IlI standing).
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